

## V. COMMERCE

### 9. IMPERIAL POLICY TOWARDS THE PORT OF VERACRUZ, 1788-1808: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN MADRID, CADIZ AND HAVANA INTERESTS

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Charles IV's commercial policy towards the port of Veracruz is well known. Indeed, historians interested in the matter are peculiarly well served as they have available Javier Ortiz de la Tabla's *Comercio exterior de Veracruz, 1788-1821: crisis de dependencia*.<sup>1</sup> That work provides both a general outline and most particulars of the subject in the form of a successful narrative account. Thanks to it, our understanding is soundly based. The facts being well established, however, we can now aspire to go beyond the political events themselves and study the hidden dynamics of policy formation.

In what follows, I contend that policy towards the port of Veracruz was shaped by the divergent economic interests of three non-Mexican cities: Madrid, Cádiz and Havana. My objectives are firstly, to define the nature of Havana's problems, and point to Veracruz's potential role in solving them; secondly, to give an overview of late eighteenth century commercial policy formation, and indicate that it was characterized by an attempt to reconcile the needs of central and coastal Spain; and thirdly, to provide a new analysis of Havana-Veracruz trade in the closing years of the colonial era, an analysis based on the interplay of the three centers indicated. The central thrust of the argument is that contradictions inherent to imperial financial and commercial policy were brought to the fore by prolonged warfare, and that the inevitable consequence was a growing incoherence between the two elements, an incoherence conducive to English and American economic penetration.

#### I.

Havana's penetration of the Veracruz market was a contentious issue during all of Charles IV's reign. The Cuban port's ambition has been rightly seen as the natural result of economic growth. Thus Ortiz de la

Tabla notes:

La libertad de comercio de 1765 acrecentó el tráfico marítimo de la isla; la guerra de independencia de las Trece Colonias lo aumentó aún más; la rebelión negra de Santo Domingo en 1791, la creación de la Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País de la Habana en 1793 y la del Consulado en 1794, las mejoras técnicas y los grandes capitales invertidos en la agricultura fueron las causas principales del auge económico cubano, cuya eclosión comercial daría como resultado el intento de ganar el mercado veracruzano...<sup>2</sup>

The crucial link between development of export-oriented agriculture and demands for commercial intercourse with Mexico was coinage. To pay for slaves, machinery, packing supplies, and foodstuff Cuba needed a constant inflow of foreign earnings and outside capital. In addition, the highly commercialized agriculture of the island required an adequate supply of circulating medium.<sup>3</sup>

As is well known, colonies which specialized in agricultural exports always had difficulties keeping enough coinage in circulation. This latter phenomenon accounts for Anglo-American experiments with paper currency, the French West Indies practice of accepting coins by tale and not weight, and the debased *plata macuquina* of the Spanish Indies. In Cuba, however, as its metropole would not allow it a legal "provincial" coinage, the problems of media of internal and external exchange tended to be one and the same. Further, given the pro-species bias of Spanish monetary police, it seemed to Cubans that the only viable solution was to find some means of keeping Mexican silver pesos flowing smoothly through the island's economy.

Havana was by far the most important Cuban port. Its customs receipts and trade balances can be used to characterize the colony's overall experience with overseas commerce in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. What such data reveals is that the ebb and flow of this trade was highly responsive to the stimulation of reform and war, and that the island was wont to suffer from a balance of trade deficit.

The former point is easily demonstrated by the 1765-1804 receipts of the Havana customs houses (see Table I). The years of peace which followed the 1765 proclamation of *comercio libre* (with its reduced tax rates), saw a steady increase in average yearly government revenues from this source. This phenomenon, of course, was but a reflection of the dramatic rise in the volume of sea-borne trade. The most dynamic

performances, however, were turned in years of revolution and war. Spanish participation in the War of American Independence boosted revenues and trade to unprecedented levels. These soon subsided to lower values, albeit they remained above those of pre-war years. The time of troubles unleashed by the onset of the French Revolution, however, allowed Cuban commerce to resume its vibrant growth. The crisis in Saint Domingue stimulated Cuban production and drove customs receipts upwards to the levels previously reached during the American war. This rise in trade and revenue continued, although at a slower tempo, during Spain's war against revolutionary France (1793-1795). The most impressive growth, however, came with the start of Charles IV's war with Great Britain (1796-1802), after which revenue volumes subsided once again, although at a higher plateau than heretofore. And in all of this, trade deficits were endemic, even in peacetime.

TABLE I: *Demonstración de los rendimientos efectivos que ha producido la administración general de rentas de mar (de la Habana) ... desde 1765 ... hasta 1804, inclusive (en pesos fuertes).*

Years	Totals	Yearly Averages
1765 - 1769	1,510,477	302,095
1770 - 1774	1,708,536	341,707
1775 - 1779	2,130,124	426,024
1780 - 1784	3,330,433	666,086
1785 - 1789	2,485,730	497,146
1790 - 1792	2,012,837	670,946
1793 - 1797	3,738,617	747,723
1798 - 1801	6,839,840	1,367,968
1802 - 1804	2,441,587	813,862

Source: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1686.

As rising customs receipts resulted from higher volumes of trade, so were the latter a reflection of increased production of such goods as sugar and tobacco. Increased production of tropical goods, however, could only be achieved through substantial investments in machinery, works and, most particularly, slaves. The rhythm of Cuban importation of blacks, boosted by the proclamation of *comercio libre de negros* in 1789, is a significant indicator of this investment (see Table II). As is obvious, although trade in general responded positively to wartime

conditions, the slave trade reacted negatively. This is perhaps because slave ships were more restricted as to sources of supply and sailing routes, and thus far less able to respond than other vessels to the hazards of war. In any event, major investments in manpower took place in peacetime. These soaked up profits and savings, leaving Havana relatively naked in the face of the immense balance of trade deficit which came with any war time boom in commerce.

TABLE II: *Slave Arrivals in Cuba, According to Alexander von Humboldt, 1790 - 1807*

Year	Number of Slaves	Year	Number of Slaves
1790	2,534	1799	4,919
1791	8,498	1800	4,145
1792	8,528	1801	1,659
1793	3,777	1802	13,832
1794	4,164	1803	9,671
1795	5,832	1804	8,923
1796	5,711	1805	4,999
1797	4,452	1806	4,395
1798	2,001	1807	2,565

Source: Alexander von Humboldt, *Ensayo político sobre la isla de Cuba* (Habana, 1960), pp.205 - 206; as found in Herbert S. Klein, *The Middle Passage* (Princeton, 1978), p.214.

The year 1805 may be taken as characteristic of the performance of Cuban external trade under war conditions (see Table III). As may be seen, Cuba suffered from an extraordinary deficit situation. Foreigners, and particularly North Americans, greatly profitted from a situation where they were able to send to Cuba twice the value of the goods which they received in return. This produced a net outflow of coins from the island, which helped to pay for the United States' trade deficits but produced a shortage of coinage in Cuba.<sup>4</sup>

Cuba's monetary problems were not inherently different from those of other colonies whose economy was based on export-oriented agriculture. Elsewhere I studied the case of Venezuela.<sup>5</sup> There, the same difficulties arose, although complicated by the Crown's export of treasury surpluses (in the form of specie) towards the peninsula. Trade with

Veracruz and with foreign colonies helped somewhat to replenish Caracas' coinage supplies, albeit inadequately by the late eighteenth century. In Venezuela, the essential challenge was to find some means of reconciling the state's thirst for funds with the economy's need for a circulating medium. That challenge was temporarily met thanks to ingenious bills of exchange transactions. Until the Crown's fiscal problems became all-consuming, a coalition of business interests was able to work out reasonable compromises with reform-minded administrators, arrangements which allowed the colony to enjoy an adequate circulating medium.

TABLE III: *Balance of Trade for Havana, 1805 (in Pesos Fuertes)*

	Imports	Exports	Total	Balance
Metropolitan Spain	515,204	34,037	549,241	481,167
Spanish Colonies	723,868	620,508	1,344,376	103,360
Foreign Ports	10,541,138	4,452,472	14,993,610	6,088,666
	11,780,210	5,107,017	16,887,227	6,673,193

Source: AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1687.

Some of the solutions adopted for Caracas were also applicable to Havana. As it did on various occasions in Venezuela, the Crown strove to take out its Cuban profits in kind – in this case, in tobacco. There is also evidence that the eastern end of the island shipped cattle to French Saint Domingue, and Veracruz was a significant trading partner. For both Venezuela and Cuba, however, Veracruz was an open port only for ships carrying colonial products.<sup>6</sup> Neither was to be allowed to become an entrepôt for European goods destined for the Mexican market. How then was Cuba to obtain or retain needed specie? As noted, Havana, like Venezuela was granted limited access to foreign colonies (and to the United States, which continued to be treated like a foreign colony), and officials promoted the export to Mexico of one of its natural products (in this case, wax). In fact, the government went so far as to encourage the island to import silver from places other than Veracruz.<sup>7</sup> Despite such palliatives, however, the Crown's true solution was entirely different, but quite direct. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the Cuban economy in these years was the continuous inflow of Mexican funds to

pay for the expenses of the *plaza, apostadero*, fortification programme, army and navy units temporarily stationed in Havana, and other official activities. To this one must add monies destined for the United States and *situados* for outlying Gulf and Caribbean locations, funds which were routed through Havana but not always sent onward in the form of cash. Havana may have wished to earn its specie through trade. Government silver, however, was undoubtedly of some consolation and served to reduce the port's need for full access to the Veracruz market.

The problem with this solution, of course, was that it placed Havana at the very nexus of the inner contradiction which threatened, in time of war, to vitiate the central thrust of the Bourbon reformist effort: the belief that both trade and treasure could be obtained from the colonies. To grasp this fact, however, one must first examine the nature of the peninsular interests served by the reforms of Charles III and Charles IV.

## II.

As I have had occasion to argue, two distinct coalitions of interests dominated colonial policy – making in the late eighteenth century: the Court and peninsular cadres on the one hand, the entrepreneurial elites of Cádiz and the Spanish coast on the other.<sup>8</sup> The Court had an innate thirst for treasure shipments, the coast an inherent need for trade. In the time of Charles III (1759–1788), fiscal and economic reforms combined to satisfy both groups. The existing literature, however, tends to take the Crown's need for specie for granted, but to closely scrutinize its novel economic policies. In consequence, the reforms which touched the interests of Cádiz and the coast are well understood. Those that relate directly to the fiscal interests of Madrid remain obscure.

For Cádiz and coastal Spain, the principal thrust of colonial policy had to be the development of the Indies trade. Ultimately, policy makers were to favour economic growth in the Spanish periphery: stimulating metropolitan productive and finishing operations by opening American markets; lowering peninsular costs and increasing re-export volume by boosting the output of colonial mining, ranching and agriculture; and, lastly, keeping at home the profits of trade and transport.

As is well known, of course, monopolists of the Consulado of Cádiz, the middlemen between European manufacturers and Spanish American consumers, fought reform tenaciously. It must be understood, however,

that their loss was not necessarily that of their city. Trade reforms did not cripple Cádiz, which continued to dominate colonial trade.<sup>9</sup> In part, this was due to the moderation of Charles III who saw to it that *comercio libre* was imposed only gradually. From 1765 to 1777 the new policy was applied only in Caribbean zones marginal to the Cádiz trade. Other areas remained subject to the traditional register ships (*navíos de registro*) and convoys (*flotas*).<sup>10</sup> Therafter, more homogenous laws were enacted, but the crucial Veracruz market was still exempted from the general regulation of 1778.<sup>11</sup> Special tonnage restrictions preserved some of the existing guarantees up to 1789. Lastly, even after the removal of quantitative limitations, exceptional rules regarding the Veracruz inter-colonial trade continued to restrict competition.<sup>12</sup> Overall, it must be granted that Cádiz merchants were given ample time to adjust to trade reform. By the start of the reign of Charles IV, therefore, coastal Spain was united in defense of its exclusive access to colonial ports. The Court's concern with patriation of specie was, for the coast, a source of mixed feelings; for although it kept the state solvent at the expense of someone else, it also caused unease as the source of these surpluses was often monopolized items of trade.

The paramount aims of the Court were the security of the state and the extension of its services. To meet these objectives a healthy level of Crown revenues was imperative, but none was prepared to sacrifice Old Regime privileges to fiscal needs. The obvious solution was to obtain external funds: colonial treasure and taxes on the Indies trade. The Crown understood, of course, that efficient administration was more likely to be effective than predatory policies. Thus, a compromise between bureaucratic and business objectives could be achieved. The difficulty, however, was that behind the concerns of the Court lay the interests of Madrid and much of central Spain. Indeed, a disproportionate share of state income was spent in the capital, and that expenditure in turn generated a significant proportion of economic activities in central Spain.<sup>13</sup> This situation ensured that, in times of trouble, when difficult choices had to be made between trade and treasury, the struggle over Crown policy would be between central and peripheral Spain, between two different modes of economic life.

As I have already shown elsewhere, during the reign of Charles IV, the Crown was increasingly driven to sacrifice its economic goals to its financial ones.<sup>14</sup> This was no free choice, of course. It resulted from a fiscal situation which had been steadily worsening ever since the War of American Independence.<sup>15</sup> In any event, sacrifice of "economic" to

"financial" goals really meant the sacrifice of the coast to Madrid's awesome need for government expenditure. Indeed, for a command economy such as that of central Spain, government solvency was the very lifeblood of agriculture, trade and manufacturing.

### III.

What does this type of analysis reveal about the evolution of policy towards Havana – Veracruz trade? I believe that, here again, one sees the gradual dissolution of the entente which made the reforms of Charles III possible. As long as that entente was in place, and to the degree possible, Havana had to be denied access to Veracruz. As the entente broke down, however, and as the Crown became more intent upon the objective of patriating American funds, Cádiz's demand that Havana not become an entrepôt became less and less compelling. Further, as the government became serious about monopolizing treasure for Madrid, it had to try to cut Cuba's links with the Mexican treasury. This, of course, would have deepened Havana's coinage problems, unless compensation was offered in the form of broadened access to Veracruz.

The chronology is suggestive. The years following the death of Charles III saw the completion of the reform process.<sup>16</sup> A *Real Decreto* of February 28, 1789 removed all tonnage restriction on Mexican and Venezuelan trade, allowed half of the goods carried to be foreign and reduced duties by 10 percent for ships carrying only national products. The order signified the extension of *comercio libre* to Mexico and Venezuela. On the other hand a *Real Ordenanza* of August 16, 1790 forbade trans-shipping of European products to Veracruz via Havana, and another of March 12, 1791 insisted that, unlike other ships of *comercio libre*, those going to Veracruz might not make stopovers in other colonial ports (those of Venezuela excepted). Cádiz objected to all such intermediate stops, but was given satisfaction only as regards the Mexican port.<sup>17</sup> What the Crown was indicating by these measures was that it was not prepared to treat Veracruz and Havana entirely in the same way as other ports. The trade of Veracruz was too valuable, Havana too well-placed to undermine mercantilist expectations. In short, the growth of Havana as a colonial center could not, in the government's view, be based on the role of the entrepôt. It had to be founded on its traditional military function and on its growing vocation as a sugar center. This latter possibility, in fact, particularly appealed to the men in command in Madrid, who showered the island and other



Caribbean regions with beneficial legislation. Foreign iron machinery was allowed to enter duty free, the rules for the black slave trade were liberalized, and the commerce of the *puertos menores* largely freed of fiscal obstacles. Most significantly, at the behest of Cuban lobbyist Francisco de Arango y Parreño, Havana was conceded special liberties for its trade in cotton, coffee, indigo, sugar, *aguardiente* and slaves, the decisions being taken in full Council of State, with the King presiding.<sup>18</sup>

Despite such a favorable predisposition, with the start of war with France in 1793 another set of Crown reservations about Havana began to come to the fore – the fear that Cuba was going to absorb funds needed in the peninsula. In a secret order the Viceroy of New Spain was instructed to be careful about sending money to Cuba to sustain its naval forces, as this should be done "con la mayor economía por ser las atenciones de Europa mas urgente."<sup>19</sup> Similarly, fearful that Havana would retain funds found aboard Spanish bound warships which stopped in Cuban waters, Madrid ordered the intendant "que con ningún motivo no pretexto detenga los caudales que lleguen a aquel puerto."<sup>20</sup> The Viceroy of New Spain Count of Revillagigedo, however, had already foreseen the new circumstances. Sending the frigate "Minerva" to Spain with cash, he gave its captain very clear orders:

prevengo a Vmd. con la mayor estrechez que es posible evite el llegar a la Habana con motivo de reponer agua, ... pero en caso de que esto no pueda verificarse no se detendra en aquel puerto mas que el tiempo preciso para ejecutarlo; advirtiendo a Vmd. que aun en el caso de recibir alguna orden del señor comandante general (de marina) de aquel puerto para entrar y permanecer en el, continúe sin embargo su viaje a España.<sup>21</sup>

The Cuban authorities, however, held a *junta de generales* when the "Minerva" came into port, quashed the viceregal orders, and took off the 3,000,000 *pesos fuertes* which the ship carried. Despite concerns over having to share funds with Havana, however, Madrid continued to grant ever more extensive commercial privileges to the port city.<sup>22</sup>

As these developments were taking place, the growth of Cuban ties to the U.S. market made Havana's trade with Mexico all the more problematical. In part, the development of such ties was due to the Spanish government itself, which ordered its diplomatic agents to ship foodstuffs on American ships to its various Caribbean bases, although the initiative shown by local officials in interpreting royal orders was more generally to blame. With peace all such contacts were banned by R.O. of January 21, 1796. On October 6, 1796, however, Spain

embarked on the first of two consecutive wars with Great Britain. The Spanish defeat at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent (February 14, 1797) guaranteed the effectiveness of the British blockade and Havana soon was thrown open to neutral ships, by local action, long before the Crown agreed to the neutral flag trade as a general principle. In fact, of course, the Consulado of Havana asked for this wartime measure in September of 1796, the month before war was declared.<sup>23</sup> At about the same time, Havana interests resumed their pressure for full access to the Veracruz market. Both of these phenomena have been well documented and need not be reviewed here. It is essential to understand, however, that the two are causally related. Indeed, as indicated above, as the receipts of Havana customs indicate, the port's trade boomed in wartime along with the exports of the island's agriculture. With greater economic activity came a heightened need for circulating medium. Access to Veracruz became ever more important, particularly as the heretofore dependable Mexican *situado* became increasingly sporadic.

As we know, Madrid resisted Havana's pressure all through the first British war. With the coming of peace, however, the situation did not return to normal for the Crown was not prepared to resume its generous support, from Mexican sources, of the Cuban treasury. As the Intendant of Havana was informed by Minister of Finances Miguel Cayetano Soler:

Ya es tiempo que aquella isla tan fertil tribute lo necesario para subsistir sin necesidad de situado, sino que lo proporcione a los parages contiguos y deje sobrantes capaces de compensar a la metrópoli.<sup>24</sup>

As Soler's commercial policy was based on a return to full mercantilistic rigor, of course, the Havana treasury was hardly likely to measure up to his expectations.

With the resumption of war with Great Britain in late 1804, Havana faced difficulties once more which could best be resolved by Mexican silver. By April of 1806 Cuban interests were able to induce officials of the ministry of finance to prepare orders opening Veracruz to the *Habaneros*. Miguel Cayetano Soler refused to sign them, however.<sup>25</sup> The deadlock was only broken when interim Intendant Rafael Gomez Roubaud complained in August 1806 directly to Godoy, the steadfast champion of Cuban interests, who supported the intendant's request for Havana - Veracruz trade.<sup>26</sup> It is significant that the intendant's petition was exclusively directed at solving Havana's balance of trade deficit. Gomez Roubaud, with the trade statistics of 1805 in hand, pointed par-

ticularly to the 6,088,666 *pesos fuertes* of deficit with foreign ports (see Table III). He insisted that only access to Veracruz would bring silver back into Havana, a city in which the ordinary circulating medium seems to have become Portuguese gold coins – a most peculiar circumstance for a Spanish colony. It is a dossier started with this letter that produced the R.O. of May 10, 1807, allowing the re-export from Havana to Veracruz of European goods.<sup>27</sup>

In conclusion, what is one to make of the affair? I believe that the Bourbon reformer's policy towards the port of Veracruz was designed to boost the economy of coastal Spain even as it was meant to safeguard the flow of funds on which that of the Madrid region was based. This double-edged policy limited the economic growth of Cuba, as it did not allow an adequate flow of coinage to the island. As the interests of Central Spain slowly gained primacy, however, those of Cádiz and the coast could then be sacrificed. The moment of truth was delayed by ideologues such as Soler, but by 1807 there was no longer any reason to prevent Havana from serving as an Anglo-American conduit to Mexico. The commercial policy characteristic of the Bourbon Reforms was no more.

## NOTES

1. Javier Ortiz de la Tabla, *Comercio exterior de Veracruz, 1778 – 1821: crisis de dependencia* (Sevilla, 1978).
2. Ibid., p.169.
3. Ibid., pp.170 – 172.
4. Jaques A. Barbier, "Venezuelan 'Libranzas', 1788 – 1807: From Economic Nostrum to Fiscal Imperative," *TA*, 37(1981), 457 – 478.
5. See Javier Cuenca Esteban, "The Changing Role and Significance of United States Trade with Spanish America and the Philippine Islands, 1780 – 1819," in Jaques A. Barbier and Allan J. Kuethe, eds., *The North American Role in the Spanish Imperial Economy, 1760 – 1819* (Manchester, 1983).
6. A slight exception was allowed for ships sailing from Spain to Veracruz via Venezuela, but even so European goods were not put on board in La Guayra or Maracaybo.
7. Ortiz de la Tabla, *Comercio exterior de Veracruz*, p.176.
8. See, Jaques A. Barbier, "Silver, North American Penetration and the Spanish Imperial Economy, 1760 – 1800," in Barbier and Kuethe, eds., *The North American Role*.
9. John R. Fisher, "Imperial 'Free Trade' and the Hispanic Economy, 1778 – 1796," *JLAS*, 13(1981), 33; and Javier Cuenca Esteban, "Statistics of Spain's Colonial Trade," *HAHR*, 61(1981), 398 – 401.

10. C.H. Haring, *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York, 1947), pp.319 – 320, briefly describes the 1765 – 1789 evolution of trade legislation.
11. Bibiano Torres Ramirez and Javier Ortiz de la Tabla, eds., *Reglamento y aranceles reales para el comercio libre de España a Indias de 12 de octubre de 1778* (Seville, 1978), p.4.
12. Ortiz de la Tabla, *Comercio exterior de Veracruz*, pp.167 – 223, which recounts the obstacles placed in the way of the Havana – Veracruz trade.
13. For an analysis of the role of Madrid in the economy of central Spain, see David R. Ringrose, "Perspectives on the Economy of Eighteenth Century Spain," *HI*, 1(1973), 59 – 101.
14. Jaques A. Barbier, "Peninsular Finance and Colonial Trade: the Dilemma of Charles IV's Spain," *JLAS*, 12(1980), 21 – 37.
15. Jaques A. Barbier and Herbert S. Klein, "Revolutionary Wars and Public Finances: The Madrid Treasury, 1784 – 1807," *JEH*, 41(1981), 315 – 339. For other views of Madrid's finances in these years see José Patricio Merino Navarro, "La hacienda de Carlos IV," *HPE*, 69(1981), 139 – 182; and Javier Cuenca Esteban, "Ingresos netos del estado español, 1788 – 1820," *HPE*, 69(1981), 183 – 228.
16. Jaques A. Barbier, "The Culmination of the Bourbon Reforms, 1787 – 1792," *HAHR*, 57(1977), 51 – 68.
17. AGI, Indiferente, leg. 2316.
18. AGI: R.D. of February 28, 1789, Ultramar, leg. 719; R.C. of February 28, 1789, Indiferente, leg. 13; R.O. of October 9, 1789, Santo Domingo, leg. 2189; minutes of Council of State meeting of October 29, 1792, Santo Domingo, leg. 1484; R.D. of November 22, 1792, Indiferente, leg. 663.
19. R.O. of February 20, 1794, AGI, Ultramar, leg. 197.
20. R.O. of February 19, 1794, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1977.
21. Junta de generales of May 3, 1793, AGI, Cuba, leg. 1457.
22. AGI: Indiferente, leg. 2823, R.O. of May 19, 1793, on tobacco for the slave trade; Consulado, libro 95, February 8, 1794, on triangular trade; Mexico, leg. 1565, Branciforte to Gardóqui, September 30, 1794, on reexport of sugar from Spain; Indiferente, leg. 665, R.O. of March 26, 1796, on all foreign tools; Mexico, leg. 3110, O'Neil to Gardóqui, June 8, 1795 and Santa Fe, leg. 644, Ezpeleta a Gardóqui, May 19, 1795, both on aguardiente trade.
23. Consulado of Havana to Gardóqui, September 29, 1796, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2191.
24. R.O. of May 13, 1802, AGI, Ultramar, leg. 195.
25. Minuta of R.O. of April 24, 1806, AGI, Ultramar, leg. 200. According to a note: "estas ordenes no tuvieron curso porque S.E. no quiso firmarlas."
26. Gomez Roubaud to Godoy, August 6, 1806, AGI, Mexico, leg. 2513.
27. Gomez Roubaud to Godoy, August 6, 1806, AGI, Mexico, leg. 2513 and Gomez Roubaud to Soler, November 30, 1807, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1688. Even as it is, the order only allows the re-export of goods "que desde esta peninsula se hayan introducidos," but that restriction was easily evaded. See also Gomez Roubaud to Soler, October 26, 1807, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1688.